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THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
ABUSES IN PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Morrison v. Olson,I the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the independent counsel provision of the
Ethics in Government Act. 2 The Court held that the appointment
and removal procedures of the provision did not violate articles 113
and 1114 of the United States Constitution, nor did the independent
counsel mechanism as a whole violate the constitutional principle of
a separation of governmental powers. This Note summarizes both
the majority's opinion in Morrison, as well as the dissent offered by
Justice Scalia. This Note then analyzes the majority's conclusions in
light of the precedent established in recent separation of powers
cases and the potential for prosecutorial abuse engendered by the
placement of the criminal law enforcement function in an office independent of the Executive Branch. This Note concludes that because there is little accountability in the office of independent
counsel, and such counsel's decisions are made unconstrained by
the institutional considerations that serve as a check on the overzealous enforcement of law, abuses in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are inevitable under the Ethics in Government Act.
Furthermore, this Note argues that the independent counsel mechanism is susceptible to subversion for purely political ends which
bear little resemblance to the original legislative intentions behind
the creation of the office.
II.

THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT

The Ethics in Government Act was enacted "to preserve and
1 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
2 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (West Supp. 1988). Congress originally enacted the Act
in 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867. It has been reenacted with minor amendments
twice since 1978. See Pub. L. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039; Pub. L. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293.
3 See infra notes 70, 76.
4 See infra note 81.
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promote the accountability and integrity of public officials and of
the institutions of the Federal Government and to invigorate the
constitutional separation of powers between the three branches of
government." 5 The Act is premised on the belief that the Executive
Branch of the federal government cannot be trusted to carry out
investigations of alleged misconduct by its own members in a vigorous and impartial manner. 6 This doubt stems from the dual nature
of the role of Attorney General, who must act as both the nation's
chief law enforcement officer and the Executive Branch's highest
ranking counsel on legal matters. Moreover, the legislators were
concerned with bias on the part of the Attorney General, who is
often a long-time friend of or confidante to the President. 7 When
allegations arise of illegal actions on the part of Executive Branch
officials, these interests compete and, it was believed, may prevent a
dispassionate and thorough investigation by the Department of
Justice.
The abuses of the Nixon Administration in the Watergate scandal demonstrated the veracity of this thesis and provided Congress
with the political support necessary to legislate preventive measures. 8 Yet remedial legislation was not passed until five years after
5 S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.

& ADMIN. NEws 4216-17 [hereinafter S. REP. 170].
6 See generally id. The Senate report states:
A study by the Congressional Research Service... identified a number of instances
over the last twenty years where, due to a serious conflict on the part of the Attorney General or the President, an investigation handled outside the Justice Depart-

ment would have been appropriate. Such incidents involved allegations of
wrongdoing against a top assistant to a President, criminal conduct by a close associate and employee of a President prior to the time the President took office, and
the investigation and prosecution of a sitting Vice President.
Id. at 4219-20.
7 Taylor, "Meese Fits Attorney General Mold: Close Ties to the Chief," L.A. Daily
J., Jan 31, 1984, at 4, col. 3 (The selection by Presidents of personal, business, or political associates as Attorneys General is common.)
8 Although on several occasions in American history, special prosecutors had been
appointed to investigate alleged criminal misconduct by high-level Federal Government
officials (e.g., the "whiskey ring" scandal of the Grant Administration and the "Teapot
Dome" scandal of the Harding Administration), the most substantial interest in the creation of a permanent mechanism arose in the wake of the "Watergate" scandal.
The public first became aware of the Watergate scandal in late 1972. In the Spring
of 1973, the Senate Judiciary Committee explored the need for a special prosecutor to
investigate scattered reports of illegal actions by members of President Nixon's Administration. In response, President Nixon made a commitment to appoint such an investigator, and, on May 25, 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson chose Archibald Cox
to perform this task. S. Rep. 170, supra note 5, at 2-3.
When in the course of his investigation, Mr. Cox insisted that the President release
accounts of presidential conversations, the President ordered him removed, in what
later became known as the "Saturday Night Massacre." After this firing, President
Nixon argued that the investigation could be handled by the Department ofJustice. But
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the scandal, a time period in which Congress held extensive hearings and considered a plethora of proposed solutions. 9 This lengthy
period of deliberation was necessary in part because of the constitutional problems presented by the creation of a law enforcement
mechanism independent of the Executive Branch.' 0 In October of
1978, the Act was passed. I1
As codified, the independent counsel provision, Title VI of the
Act, applies only to senior officials of the executive branch, including the president, vice-president, and the cabinet. 12 It requires the
attorney general to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt
of information suggesting that an included executive official has
committed a serious federal crime. 13
Only information "sufficient to constitute grounds to investitheJudiciary Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives held extensive
hearings on legislation to require the appointment of a temporary special prosecutor.
Faced with an enormous public outcry over the Cox firing and the rising probability of
congressional action demanding such an appointment, President Nixon appointed Leon
Jaworski as special prosecutor. Id.
In the spring of 1974, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Judiciary Committee held hearings on proposed ways of removing political considerations from the administration of justice. Among the major conclusions drawn by the
Subcommittee from these initial hearings was that, "No one who has watched 'Watergate' unfold can doubt that theJustice Department has difficulty investigating and prosecuting high officials, or that an independent prosecutor is freer to act according to
politically neutral principles of fairness and justice." WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION
FORCE FINAL REPORT, at 137-38 (1977). See generally, S. Rep. 170, supra note 5, at 2-3,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code & Cong. & Ad. News at 4218-19.
9 Fifty-seven bills providing for a special prosecutor were introduced in the 93rd
Congress alone. Cong. Index (CCH) 222 (1974). In the 94th and 95th Congresses,
twenty-five special prosecutor bills were introduced. See Brief for Appellants at Addendum A, Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Many legal scholars, members of the bar, present and former high officials, and
other interested parties provided testimony before the congressional committees formulating special prosecutor legislation. See, e.g., HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); HearingsBefore the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
10 Congressional committees considering legislation were "confronted with sharply
conflicting testimony regarding the constitutionality of a special prosecutor whose appointment and removal were totally separated from the executive branch." S. REP. No.
273, 95th Cong., Sess. 2 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4376,
4377. See also Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMErE L.REv. 539,
540 (1988)("The constitutionality of insulating prosecution from presidential control
has been uncertain from the Act's inception.").
11 See supra note 2.
12 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (West Supp. 1988).
13 Id. at § 591 (a). This section states: "The Attorney General shall conduct a preliminary investigation.., whenever the Attorney General receives information sufficient to
constitute grounds to investigate whether any person described in subsection (b) may
have violated any Federal criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class B or C
misdemeanor or an infraction." Id.
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gate" is required to warrant the appointment of an independent
counsel.14 In determining whether such grounds exist, "the Attorney General shall consider only the specificity of the information
6
received; 15 and the credibility of the source of the information."'
If, after preliminary investigation, the Attorney General determines
that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted," he or she must apply to a Special Division of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the appointment of an independent counsel.1 7 Conversely, if the Attorney
General concludes that there are "no reasonable grounds" to warrant further investigation, the case is terminated.' 8
Although a decision not to continue the investigation is not
subject to judicial review,' 9 the Attorney General is required upon
such a determination to present the Special Division with "a summary of the information received and a summary of the results of
the preliminary investigation. ' ' 2 0 An appointment of an independent counsel may also be requested by members of Congress. The
Attorney General must then determine whether such an appointment is necessary and if not, he must "submit a report ... stating
the reasons why such an application was not made, addressing each
matter with respect to which the congressional request was
2
made." 1
The Ethics in Government Act directs the Special Division of
the Court of Appeals to appoint the independent counsel and to
define the scope of his or her jurisdiction to include subjects speci14

Id.

15 Id. at § 591 (d)(1)(A).
16 Id. at § 591 (d)(1)(B).
17 Id. at § 592 (c)(1)(A). Also, under § 592(c)(1)(B), the Attorney General shall apply

for such an appointment if the three month time period generally allotted for the preliminary investigation passes and the Attorney General "has not filed notification with
the division of the court" that further investigation is not warranted. See Id. § 592(b)(1).
18 Id. at § 592(b)(1). This section states: "The Attorney General shall notify the
Special Division of this decision," id. and "such notification shall contain a summary of
the information received and a summary of the results of the preliminary investigation."
Id. at § 592(b)(2).
19 The non-review section of the statute states: "The Attorney General's determination under this chapter to apply to the division of the court for the appointment of an
independent counsel shall not be reviewable in any court." Id. at § 592(f). Although
from the language of the statute it is not clear that this includes a determination by the
Attorney General not to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel, the Morrison majority interpreted it as such: "'the courts are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's decision not to seek appointment. § 592(f)," Morrison, 108
S. Ct. at 2621. Justice Scalia reached a similar conclusion in his dissent, although his was
based on a different rationale. See id. at 2625 n.1. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
592
21 Id. at §
(g)(3).
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fled in the Attorney General's application, as well-as related matters. 22 This jurisdiction may be expanded upon request by the
Attorney General, 2 3 either on his own initiative or in response to an
evaluation of information discovered and submitted by the independent counsel. 24 Upon appointment, the independent counsel
receives the full investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Department ofJustice,2 5 whose policies respecting enforcement of the
criminal laws he or she must follow "except where not possible." 2 6
In addition to this broad endowment of prosecutorial power, further
specific powers are conferred upon the independent counsel by the
2 7

Act.

The Attorney General's decision to remove the counsel "for
good cause" 28 is subject to judicial review. 29 The Special Division
Id. at § 593(b)(1-3).
Id. at § 593(c)(1).
Id. at § 593(c)(2)(A)-(C), § 594(e). In evaluating whether information discovered
by the independent counsel warrants an expansion of his or her jurisdiction, the Attorney General shall "accord[] great weight to the recommendations of the independent
counsel." Id. at § 594(e).
25 Id. at § 594(a).
26 Id. at § 594(0.
27 Id. at § 594(a)(l)-(10). These powers include:
Such investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers shall include(1) conducting proceedings before grand juries and other investigations;
(2) participating in court proceedings and engaging in any litigation, including civil and criminal matters, that such independent counsel considers necessary;
(3) appealing any decision of a court in any case or proceeding in which such
independent counsel participates in an official capacity;
(4) reviewing all documentary evidence available from any source;
(5) determining whether to contest the assertion of any testimonial privilege;
(6) receiving appropriate national security clearances and, if necessary, contesting in court . . . any claim of privilege or attempt to withhold evidence on
grounds of national security;
(7) making applications to any Federal court for a grant of immunity to any
witness, consistent with applicable statutory requirements, or for warrants, subpoenas, or other court orders, and, for purposes of sections 6003, 6004, and 6005 of
title 18, exercising the authority vested in a United States attorney or the Attorney
General;
(8) inspecting, obtaining, or using the original or a copy of any tax return, in
accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations, and, for purposes of section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the regulations issued thereunder, exercising the powers vested in a United States attorney or the Attorney
General;
(9) initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations, and handling all aspects
of any case, in the name of the United States; and
(10) consulting with the United States attorney for the district in which any
violation of law with respect to which the independent counsel is appointed was
alleged to have occurred.
Id.
28 Id. at § 596(a)(1). Besides good cause, the Attorney General may remove for reasons of "physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties." Id.
22
23
24
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may terminate the office on grounds that the investigation has been
"substantially completed," 3 0 and the counsel him or herself may terminate his or her office on the same grounds. 31
Congress retains "oversight jurisdiction with respect to the official conduct of any independent counsel ....and such independent
counsel [has] the duty to cooperate with the exercise of such oversight jurisdiction."' 32 The independent counsel must advise the
House of Representatives of any "substantial and credible information" he or she receives which may constitute grounds for an impeachment of an Executive officer. 3 3 Congress also retains
supervisory authority over the conduct of the Attorney General,
who must provide upon congressional request information regarding any case arising under the independent counsel provision. 34
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September 1982, two subcommittees of the House of Representatives requested the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to provide them with internal agency documents relating to the efforts of the EPA and the Land and Natural Resources Division of the
Department ofJustice ("DOJ") to clean up hazardous waste sites as
required by the "Superfund Law."' 35 Under direction from the DOJ,
the EPA complied partially with the subcommittee request, but withheld certain documents, claiming that congressional access to such
36
sensitive materials would interfere with law enforcement efforts.
29 Id. at § 596(a)(3). "An independent counsel removed from office may obtain judicial review of the removal in a civil action.... The independent counsel may be reinstated or granted other appropriate relief by order of the court." Id.
30 Id. at § 596(b)(2).
31 Id. at § 596(b)(1)(A).
32 Id. at § 595(a)(1).
33 Id. at § 595(c).
34 Id. at § 595(b). The Attorney General must provide Congress with the following
information:
(1) When the information about the case was received.
(2) Whether a preliminary investigation is being conducted, and if so, the date it
began.
(3) Whether an application for the appointment of an independent counsel or a
notification that further investigation is not warranted has been filed with the division of the court, and if so, the date of such filing.
Id.
35 Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767;
42 U.S.C. § 9601. A primary motivation for the request was the concern of House members that the Reagan Administration was expending funds in order to aid Republican
candidates for Senate in the 1982 elections. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
36 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 478.
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After attempts for a negotiated compromise between the two
branches failed, the House subcommittees issued subpoenas to the
37
EPA Administrator, ordering compliance with the earlier request.
At that time, appellee Theodore B. Olson was the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel; appellee Edward C.
Schmults was Deputy Attorney General; and appellee Carol E.
Dinkins was the Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natu38
ral Resources Division.
Acting on the advice of the DOJ, the President ordered the Administrator of the EPA to invoke executive privilege and refuse to
comply with the subpoenas. 39 The House of Representatives responded by citing the Administrator for contempt, after which the
Administrator and the United States together filed a lawsuit against
the House. 40 In March of 1983, the conflict abated as the Administrator and the two subcommittees reached an agreement providing
41
limited access to the documents.
Concurrent to this series of events, a subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee had begun an investigation into the involvement of DOJ in the EPA document controversy. 4 2 As part of
that investigation, Assistant Attorney General Olson testified before
the subcommittee on March 10, 1983. 4 3 Both before and after that

testimony, DOJ complied with several requests from this subcommittee to produce certain documents related to the EPA dispute.4 4
At the completion of the investigation, the HouseJudiciary Committee issued a lengthy report, over the vigorous dissent of its minority
party members. 45 The report criticized various DOJ officials for
their actions in the EPA executive privilege dispute. 4 6 It suggested
that appellee Olson had given false and misleading testimony in his
appearance of March 10, 1983, and that appellees Dinkins and
Schmults had wrongfully withheld certain documents from the
37 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2605. For a more detailed account of the facts underlying
the records request, see Brand & Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a
Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 71 (1986).
38 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2605.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2606. See Report on Investigation of the Role of the Department OfJustice in the
Withholding of EnvironmentalProtectionAgency Documentsfrom Congress in 1982-83, H.R. REP.
No. 435, 99th Congr., 1st Sess. (1985).
46 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2606.
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Committee, thus obstructing its investigation. 4 7 The Committee
Chairman forwarded a copy of the report to the Attorney General
with a request, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act's independent counsel provision, 48 that an independent counsel be ap49
pointed to investigate the allegations.
The Attorney General directed the Public Integrity Section of
the Criminal Division to conduct a preliminary investigation. 50 The
Section's report concluded that the appointment of an independent
counsel was warranted to investigate all three appellees. 5 1 After
consulting with other DOJ officials, the Attorney General chose to
apply to the Special Division for the appointment of an independent
counsel with respect to Olson only. 5 2 On April 10, 1986, the Attor-

ney General asked the Special Court to appoint an independent
counsel to investigate
[w]hether the conduct of former Assistant Attorney General Theodore
Olson in giving testimony at a hearing of the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee on
March 10, 1983, and later revising that testimony, regarding the completeness of the Office of Legal Counsel's response to the Judiciary
Committee's request for OLC documents, and regarding his knowledge of EPA's willingness to turn over certain disputed documents to
Congress, violated 185 3U.S.C. § 1505 § 1001, or any other provision of
federal criminal law.
The Attorney General also requested that the independent counsel
have authority to investigate "any other matter related to that
investigation.

54

On May 29, 1986, the Special Court appointed appellant Alexia
Morrison as independent counsel. 55 Morrison's jurisdiction covered an investigation into " 'whether the testimony of... Olson and
his revision of such testimony on March 10, 1983, violated either 18

49

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (West Supp. 1988).
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2606.

50

Id.

47
48

Id.
Id. The Attorney General concluded that appellees Schmults and Dinkins lacked
the requisite "criminal intent" to impede upon the Committee's investigation. Id.
53 Id. (quoting Report of the Attorney General Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) Regarding
Allegations Against Department ofJustice Officials in United States House Judiciary Committee Report, at 2-3 (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Report of the Attorney General]).
54 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2606 (quoting Report of the Attorney General, supra note 53, at
11).
55 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2606. Originally, on April 23, 1986, James C. McKay had
been appointed as independent counsel but he resigned shortly after because of a conflict of interest. Morrison was appointed to replace him. Id.
51

52
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The Special Court also ordered that the independent counsel
shall have jurisdiction to investigate any other allegation of evidence
of violation of any Federal criminal law by Theodore Olson, developed
during investigations, by the Independent Counsel, referred to above,
and connected with or arising out of that investigation, and Independent Counsel
shall have jurisdiction to prosecute for any such
57
violation.
In November of 1986, Morrison applied to the Attorney General for expanded jurisdiction to probe as "related matters" the Judiciary Committee's allegations against Schmults and Dinkins. 5s In
particular, Morrison wanted to investigate "whether Mr. Olson's
testimony was part of a larger, concerted plan, including Mr.
Schmults, Ms. Dinkins, or others, to obstruct or impede the Committee's investigation . . .possibly in violation of federal criminal
law." 59 The Attorney General refused the application because his
initial investigation of the Committee's allegations had " 'found no
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation of the Committee's allegations is warranted,'" specifically including any criminal conspiracy among the appellees. 6 0 Morrison then appealed to
the Special Court to order that her jurisdiction be expanded. 6 1 On
April 2, 1987, the Division ruled that the Attorney General's initial
decision not to seek appointment of an independent counsel with
regard to Schmults and Dinkins was final and unreviewable, and
thus the Special Court had no authority to grant the appellant's request. 62 The court ruled, however, that "authority to investigate allegations and evidence that Theodore Olson was engaged in an
unlawful conspiracy with others" was implicit in its original grant of
jurisdiction, so that inquiry into the allegations against Schmults
63
and Dinkins was permissible.
After this ruling, in May and June of 1987, the independent
56 Id. (quoting Order, Div. No. 86-1 (CADC Special Division, April 23, 1986)). 18
U.S.C. § 1505 and 8 U.S.C. § 1001 criminalize the obstruction of proceedings before
congressional committees.
57 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2606 (quoting Order, Div. No. 86-1).
58 Id. at 2606. Morrison's request for expanded jurisdiction was made pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 594(e), "Referral of Other Matters to an Independent Counsel." See supra note
24.
59 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 479-480 (quoting Letter from Alexia Morrison to
Edwin Meese III 3 (Nov. 14, 1986)).
60 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 480 (quoting Letter from Arnold I. Burns, Deputy
Attorney General, to Alexia Morrison 2 (Dec. 17, 1986)).
61 Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2606.
62 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 480. The Court based its decision of non-reviewability on 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988). See supra notes 18-19.
63 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 480.
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counsel caused a grand jury to issue subpoenas on the appellees. 64
All three appellees moved to quash the subpoenas on the ground
that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were unconstitutional. 6 5 On July 20, 1987, the district
court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 66 In order to pursue

their challenge to the Act on appeal, the appellees refused to comply with the subpoenas, and were held in contempt of the district
court. 6 7 The court, however, stayed the effect of its contempt or-

68
ders pending an expedited appeal.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit voted two to one to reverse. 69 The court held that an independent counsel is not an "inferior Officer" of the United States
in the context of the "Appointments Clause" 70 of the Constitution:
[W]e think the independent counsel's authority is so broad as to compel the conclusion that she is a principal officer and therefore her appointment by the Special Court is unconstitutional. After all, the
independent counsel's authority is-at least with respect to any matter
within her jurisdiction-broader even than the Attorney General's...
[T]he independent counsel has authority unchecked by the President
himself to decide that an7investigation
shall continue and that a prose1
cution shall be initiated.
Therefore, the court of appeals ruled that the Act was unconstitutional because it does not provide for the independent counsel to be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as is re73
quired by the clause 72 for the appointment of "principal" officers.
The court further stated that, even if it is assumed arguendo
that the independent counsel is an inferior officer, the Act is uncon64 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2607.
65 Id.
66 In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. 1987).
67 Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2607.
68 Id.
69 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
70 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 states:

[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
That part of this clause that provides for the appointment of inferior officers is called the
"excepting clause."
71 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 486.
72 See supra note 70.
73 In re Sealed Case,

838 F.2d at 484. The court stated that "under the [appointments] clause, only if she is an inferior officer can she be appointed without action by the
President and without the advice and consent of the Senate." Id.
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stitutional on four other grounds. 74 First, according to the court,
the Act also violates the appointments clause by empowering a court
of law to appoint an inferior officer who performs "core" executive
functions: "A statute that vests the appointment of an officer who
prosecutes the criminal law in some branch other than the executive
obstructs the President's ability to execute the law-a duty the President can practically carry out only through appointed officials." 75 "
Second, the court of appeals said, the Act violates the President's constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are "faithfully executed" 76 by imposing a "good cause" limitation on the independent
counsel's removal, 7 7 delegating to a "Special Court" the authority
to review the dismissal of an independent counsel by the Attorney
General, 78 and empowering the Special Court to appoint an interim
independent counsel and to reinstate a dismissed independent
counsel.

79

Third, the court concluded that, notwithstanding Morrison's
contention that history demonstrates that Presidents cannot be
trusted to ensure that their senior appointed officials obey the criminal laws, "the Act viewed as a whole, taking into account its appointment, removal, and supervisory provisions, so deeply invades the
President's executive prerogatives and responsibilities and so jeop80
ardizes individual liberty as to be unconstitutional."
Finally, the court held that the Act violates the separation of
powers by delegating to the Special Division executive powers that
are not permitted it under article 11181 of the Constitution. 2 The
case or controversy requirement of article III, section 2,83 said the
74

Id.

75 Id. at 490.
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides that "[t]he President shall take Care that the Laws

be faithfully executed."
77 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 497-501.
78 Id. at 501-503.
79 Id. at 503.
80 Id. at 511.
81

U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 reads, in part:

"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State-between citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same States claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
82 Id.
83 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (191 1)(under the Constitution of the
United States, the exercise of judicial power is limited to cases and controversies).
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court, "preserves an independent and neutral judiciary, relatively
'8 4
removed from decisions and activities of the other two branches.
The Ethics in Government Act involves the Special Division not only
in the appointment process but in the non-article III function of
monitoring the day-to-day activities of an Executive Branch official
86
as well. 85 Thus, the court held the provision unconstitutional.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in
Government Act violates the appointments clause of the Constitution,8 7 exceeds the article III limitations on judicial power,88 or impermissibly interferes with the President's executive authority as
granted by article 1189 so as to violate the consitutional principle of
separation of powers. 90
IV.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decisions
and held that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act are constitutional. 9 1 ChiefJustice Rehnquist deliv92
ered the majority opinion.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that central to the determination
of the Act's constitutionality was the position of the independent
counsel within the executive branch hierarchy as either a principal
or an inferior officer. 93 The principal/inferior delineation was cru84
85
86
87
88
89

In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 512.
See supra notes 18-20, 29.
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 511-17.
See supra note 70.
See supra note 8 1.
See supra note 76.

90 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2602.
91 Id. at 2607.
92 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion. Justice
Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
93 Id. at 2608. The Constitution "for purposes of appointments ...divides all its
officers into two classes," namely principal and inferior. United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. (Otto) 508, 509 (1879) (an abbreviated appointment process for non-officer agents
of the government does not violate article II, section 2.) A process involving the executive and legislature is necessary to fill each principal office. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
132 (1976). See infra notes 234-42 and accompanying text for an extensive discussion of
Buckley. With regard to inferior officers, however, a more expeditious process is
available:
foreseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary,
this mode [involving both the President and Congress] might be inconvenient, [the
Constitution] provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specifically mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
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cial to the appellate court's invalidation of the Act. 94 The Ethics in
Government Act allows for appointment of the independent counsel
through the shortened process available for inferior officers. 95
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[t]he initial question is ...
whether appellant is an 'inferior' or a 'principal' officer. If she is the
' 96
latter.., then the Act is in violation of the Appointments Clause.
The majority found sufficient statutory limitations on the office
of independent counsel to qualify it as an inferior officer.9 7 Despite
a certain degree of independence from the President and Attorney
General, the Court noted that the Attorney General retains the
power to remove the counsel.9 8 Also, the Court found that the limited tenure, jurisdiction, and duties of the independent counsel indicated its inferior status. 9 9 Consequently, under United States v.
Germaine, 00° which considered the "ideas of tenure, duration....
and duties" as determinative of whether the officer is a principal or
an inferior, the Court concluded that the independent counsel is an
inferior official. 1 1
The Court went on to address Olson's alternative contention
that, even assuming that the independent counsel is an inferior officer, the appointments clause does not empower Congress to create
an interbranch appointment scheme. Olson had argued that the
vesting of the power to choose the inferior officer in a body outside
the Executive Branch, such as the Special Division, is unconstitu02
tional as contravening the meaning of the appointments clause.'
10 3
The Court rejected this argument on three grounds.
First, according to the Court, the language of the excepting
provision in the appointments clause indicated no limitation on in104
terbranch appointments in the manner for which Olson argued.
Rather, the Court said that the language seemed to allow Congress
Germaine, 99 U.S.(Otto) at 510.
94 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
96 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2608-09.
100 99 U.S.(Otto) 508 (1879).
101 Id. at 2609 (citing Germaine, 99 U.S. (Otto) at 511). As further authority for this
conclusion, the Court cited United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898)("vice counsel" appointed in the interim of the absence of the consul, a principal officer, is not
himself a principal officer because he "is charged with the performance of the duty of
the superior for a limited time and under special and temporary conditions.").
102 Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2609-10.
103
104

Id.
Id. at 2610.
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significant discretion in the vesting of appointment power.' 0 5 Second, the Court found nothing in the intent of the Framers to imply
10 6
such a prohibition not found in the Clause's express language.
Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the appointment process
of the independent counsel provision conformed with the limits the
Court had previously set on interbranch appointments.' 0 7 The
Court cited the test for the propriety of an interbranch appointment
of inferior officers it had established in Ex parte Siebold,10 8 in which it
rejected a strict separation of powers.' 0 9 The Siebold Court stated
that without evidence of "incongruity" between the constitutionally
mandated duties of the branch and the additional duty to appoint
imposed upon it, an interbranch appointment process was valid. 10
Similarly, the Morrison Court did not find any inherent incongruity
in a specially created federal court having the power to appoint
prosecutorial officers."'I The majority cited as precedent Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,112 and Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 113 which had already validated the judicial appointment
14
of prosecutors in special circumstances."
Furthermore, the Court noted, the office of independent counsel arose precisely because Congress believed and events demonstrated that the Executive Branch could not be wholly entrusted
with the duty of investigating itself. Thus, if for no other reason
than by a process of elimination (as Congressional appointment of
the independent counsel would be clear self-aggrandizement), the
15
duty was vested in the judiciary."
The Court then went on to examine the Ethics in Government
105 Id.
106 Id. The only recorded comment regarding the excepting clause was by James
Madison, who believed that Congress should be allowed to vest appointment powers in
"Superior Officers below Heads of Departments" and therefore the clause did not go far
enough. Id. at 2610-11 (quoting RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 627-28
(M. Farrand ed. 1966)).
107 Id. at 2611.
108 100 U.S. (10 Otto.) 371 (1880). In Siebold, the Court upheld a statute placing appointment of federal election supervisors in the courts. The Court in that case reasoned, "[t]he duty to appoint inferior officers, when required thereto by law, is a
constitutional duty of the courts; and in the present case there is no such incongruity in the
duty required as to excuse the court from its performance, or to render their acts void."
Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
109 ,Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2609.
11o Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398.
11 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2610-11.
112 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987). For a discussion of this case, see infra note 263.
113 282 U.S. 344 (193 l)(courts may appoint federal commissioners who possess certain limited prosecutorial powers).
114 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611.
115 Id.
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Act with regard to article 111116 of the Constitution delimiting the
responsibilities of the judiciary. 11 7 The Court had refined this delimitation in Buckley v. Valeo, t l8 and Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
the proposition from that case that " 'executive or administrative
duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.' "119 But, the Court
reasoned, because the power to appoint an independent counsel derives from the appointments clause of article II, an objection based
on article III would not be persuasive. 120 That is, the source of the
authority by which the Special Division becomes involved in the executive function of law enforcement, reasoned the Court, is separate
and independent of article III, precluding any article III arguments
against the validity of this Special Division power.' 2 ' Because the
Court had already decided earlier in the opinion on the validity of
the Ethics in Government Act under the appointments clause, the
Court concluded that the Act was immune to this article III attack.' 2 2 The duty of definition of the scope of investigation was, in
turn, clearly incidental to the appointment power, said the Court,
and thus it too withstood appellees' characterization as an invalid
vesting of authority.12 3
Regarding the-various administrative duties granted to the Special Division which were not incidental to the duty of appointment,
the Court replied, "[w]e do not think that Article III absolutely prevents Congress from vesting these other miscellaneous powers in
the Special Division pursuant to the Act."' 124 The Court said that a
primary purpose of the separation of executive and administrative
functions from the courts is to prevent the judicial assumption of
duties that either the Executive or the Legislature could accomplish
more properly. 12 5 Consequently, the Court saw no real encroachment on the proper functions of the other two branches because
116

See supra note 81.

17 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2612 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 123).
120 Id. at 2612.
121 Id. at 2612-13.
122 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist flatly stated, "[c]learly, once it is accepted that the
Appointments Clause gives Congress the power to vest the appointment of officers such
as the independent counsel in the 'courts of Law', there can be no Article III objection
to the Special Division's exercise of that power." Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 2613.
118

119

125

Id.
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many of the Special Division's powers were passive,1 2 6 or analogous
to the established functions of federal judges in other contexts 2 7
128
and not inherently "core" executive functions.
Commenting on the Special Division's power to remove the independent counsel under section 596(b)(2) of the Ethics in Government Act, the Court admitted that this authority was atypical of
usual judicial responsibilities and tended more towards the category
of administrative duties. 129 Yet, it once more found no significant
encroachment upon Executive power or the independent counsel's
prosecutorial discretion. 130 Construing Section 596(b)(2) narrowly,
the Court stated:
The termination provisions of the Act do not give the Special Division
anything approaching the power to remove the counsel while an investigation or court proceeding is still underway-this power is vested
solely in the Attorney General. As we see it, "termination" may occur
only when the duties of the counsel are truly "completed" or "so substantially completed" that there remains
no need for any continuing
3
action by the independent counsel.' '
The Court found the exercise of this power valid in the rare situation in which an independent counsel obstinately and without authority attempted to continue her investigation beyond the
32
completion of her original function.
Finally, the Court rejected the article III contentions of appellees that the Special Division's involvement in the early stages of an
investigation under the Ethics Act threatened the fair and impartial
adjudication of any claims brought later by the independent counsel.' 33 The Court said that the Act sufficiently isolates the Special
Division by giving it no power to review any actions of the counsel
or the Attorney General with regard to the counsel, as well as providing a general prohibition on any of its judges from participating
in any judicial proceeding involving an independent counsel.13 4
After this discussion of article III issues, the majority concluded
126 Id. The Court provided as an example the receipt of reports from the Attorney
General and the independent counsel but no power to act upon them. Id.
127 Id. at 2614. The Court provided as an example a court's decision to extend a
grand jury investigation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
128 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2614.
129 Id.

130 Id.
131 Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
132 Id. at 2614-15.
133 Id. at 2615.
134 Id. The Act, the Court noted, prohibits members of the Special Division from
participating in "any judicial proceeding concerning a matter which involves such independent counsel while such independent counsel is serving in that office of which
involves the exercise of such independent counsel's official duties, regardless of whether
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its opinion by examining the validity of the Act in light of the constitutionally implied principle of a separation of governmental powers.1 3 5 The Court inquired as to whether the good cause restriction
on the power of removal by the Attorney General, or more generally, the Act as a whole, impermissibly interfered with the Presi36
dent's duty to control prosecution by the federal government.'
The Court said that the Act was not an attempt by Congress to
gain for itself more power at the expense of power lost by the President. 13 7 The Act did not provide a greater ability for Congress to
remove executive officers, said the Court, because Congress can do
so only through its constitutional endowment of the power to impeach and convict.1 3 8 Instead, the Court ruled, the removal of the
independent counsel is vested primarily in the Executive Branch itself, in the office of Attorney General. 39 In this way, the Court reasoned, the independent counsel process of the Act was clearly
distinguishable from the earlier approaches struck down in Myers v.
United States 140 and Bowsher v. Synar.' 4 1 Unlike the situations of
those cases, the Morrison Court found that no power of removal de14 2
volved onto Congress under the Ethics in Government Act.
Rather, said the Court, "the Act puts the removal power squarely in
the hands of the Executive Branch" and no congressional approval
43
is necessary.'
The Court considered the propriety of the Act's placement of a
such independent counsel is still serving in that office." 28 U.S.C. § 49() (West Supp.
1988).
135 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2616.
136 Id.
137
138
139
140

Id.

Id.
Id.
272 U.S. 52 (1926). At issue in Myers was a statute providing that certain postmasters could be removed only "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." The
President had removed one such postmaster without Senate approval, and the Senate
challenged this action in court. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional
because it permitted Congress to "draw to itself.., the power to remove or the right to
participate in the exercise of that power. To do this would be to go beyond the words
and implications of the [appointments clause] and to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers." Id. at 161.
141 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Six decades after Myers, the Bowsher Court based its invalidation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on that decision. The later situation similarly
involved the statutory authorization of a government official, the Comptroller General,
who was removable only by Congress, to participate in the "executive powers" of
budget implementation. There, the Court ruled that "Congress cannot reserve for itself
the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text
for further discussion of Bowsher.
142 Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2616.
143 Id.
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"good cause" requirement on the Attorney General, instead of allowing for removal at will. 14 4 The Court stated that the validity of
such a requirement is not based on whether the Court classifies the
official in question (here, the independent counsel) as a "purely executive" functionary. 45 Such a basis, said the Court, would require
the Court to define rigid classes of officials removable and not removable at will. 14 6 Rather, according to the Court, the intent in the

analysis of removal cases is to ensure that the Legislative Branch
does not unduly intrude on the Executive's discharge of his constitutionally-appointed duties. 1 4 7 The majority relied upon the characterization of certain governmental duties as "quasi-judicial" and
"quasi-legislative," as shown in Humphrey's Executor v. United States 14 8
and Wiener v. United States. 14 9 The Morrison Court stated:
[This] characterization of the agencies in Humphrey's Executor and Wiener ... in large part reflected our judgement that it was not essential to

the President's proper execution of his Article II powers that those
agencies be headed up by individuals who were removable at will. We
do not mean to suggest that an analysis of the functions served by the
officials at issue is irrelevant. But the real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty and the functions of
144
145

Id.
Id. at 2618.

146 Id. at 2618-19. "[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions are of
such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty
and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light." Id.
147 Id.

148 295 U.S. 602 (1935). In Humphrey's Executor, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute limiting the President's power to remove commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission to situations of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office." Id. at 619. The Court held that the President did not have illimitable removal
power over officials whose functions were not purely executive because such functioning
required a degree of freedom from executive interference: "For it is quite evident that
one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon
to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will." Id. at 629. Thus,
because the FTC's duties included primarily quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, the commissioner was not "purely executive" and executive removal of such an
officer could be limited. Those whose functions are "purely executive" are "merely one
of the units in the executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive
and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid [he
or she) is." Id. In short, Humphrey's Executor established the following test: "Whether the
power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress
to condition the power by ... precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon
the character of the office." Id. at 631.
149 357 U.S. 349 (1958). The Humiphrev's Executor test was applied in lWiener. The issue
was whether the President had unlimited discretion in the removal of a member of the
War Claims Commission, created by the War Claims Act, 62 Stat. 1240 (1948). There
the Court also found "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" powers possessed by the
official and thus the President's removal authority was susceptible to restriction. lliener,
357 U.S. at 354-55.
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the official in question must be analyzed in that light.' 50
Given the limitations on the office of independent counsel, the President's need to control such an officer to maintain the functioning of
the Executive Branch, said the Court, did not extend to the ability to
terminate the counsel at will. 15 1 The majority found that the removal limitation ensured the necessary degree of independence
15 2
without impermissibly intruding on presidential duties.
The majority's final consideration was "whether the Act, taken
as a whole, violates the principle of separation of powers by unduly
interfering with the role of the Executive Branch."' 153 The Court
balanced the value of a separation of powers, emphasized in Buckley
as " 'a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other,' "154 against the
pragmatic view espoused by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer:15 5 "While the Constitution diffuses power the
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity." 156 The Court found the latter approach appropriate in
15 7
evaluating the Ethics in Government Act.
The Court stated that, unlike the Bowsher situation, the Act attempts no legislative usurpation of executive functions because
Congress' role under the Act is limited. 5 8 Although its members
may request the Attorney General to apply to the Special Division
for appointment of an independent counsel, the Court said that the
Attorney General is not required to comply under the language of
the Act. 159 Beyond this power to request, said the Court, the Act
grants to Congress the power to oversee the counsel's activities' 6 0
and to receive reports generated by the investigation from the
counsel. 16' The Court found that such functions were "recognized
150 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
151 Id.
152
153

Id. at 2619-20.
Id. at 2620.

154 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122).
155 343 U.S. 579 (1952)(presidential order for seizure of private steel mills to avert
strike is not authorized under the Constitution).
156 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635).
157 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620-21.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. The Court was referring to 28 U.S.C. §§ 595(a)(1), 595(c). See supra notes 32-

33 and accompanying text.
161 Id. The Court was referring to 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988).

972

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 79

generally as being incidental" to Congress' legislative function. 162
Similarly, the Act did not empower the Judiciary at the expense of
the Executive because the Special Division must rely on the initiative
of the Attorney General to become involved in the execution of the
Act. 16 3 Finally, the Court found no impermissible undermining or
blockage of the exercise of executive duties. 16 4 Although recognizing that "[i]t is undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and, through him, the
President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity," the Court noted that the Act
also gave the Attorney General several means of controlling an investigation by an independent counsel.' 6 5 Most important of these
means are the powers of appointment application and good cause
removal.' 6 6 Consequently, the Court voted to uphold the constitu67
tionality of the independent counsel provision.'
V.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT

Justice Scalia viewed the majority's opinion as incomplete and
overly reliant on a technical interpretation of the independent counsel provision.168 The incompleteness of the majority's approach was
due, he argued, to the insufficient attention it gave to the separation
of powers issue: "The Court devotes most of its attention to such
relatively technical details as the Appointments Clause and the removal power, addressing briefly and only at the end of its opinion,
69 Justhe separation of powers ...I think that has it backwards."'
tice Scalia argued that the separation of powers issue dominates the
case because it arose out of a direct confrontation between the President and the Congress. 170 The struggle for political power is its
fundamental theme, said Justice Scalia: "That is what this suit is
about. Power."" 7 1 Justice Scalia noted that a concentration of
power in the legislative branch had been foreseen by the Framers,
162 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621. For further authority for this conclusion, the Court

cited McGrain v. Daugherty, 272 U.S. 135 (1927)(each house of Congress has power,
through its own process, to compel a private individual to appear before it or one of its
committees and give testimony needed to enable it to exercise efficiently a legislative
function belonging to it under the Constitution).
163 Monrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.at 2621-22.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2625 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
169 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
17o Id. at 2623 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
171 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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and they subsequently took measures to guard against such an
imbalance:
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of
self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconvenience is to divide
the legislature into different branches.... As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of
the executive
may require, on the other hand, that it should be
72
fortified.'

Justice Scalia concluded that these measures must be reinforced. 173
Such fortification was accomplished in part by the creation of a single, unitary President in whom, as Justice Scalia described, all execu174
tive power was vested.
Justice Scalia began his dissent with the assertion that, under
Article II, section 1, clause 1 of the Constitution, all of the executive
power shall be vested in the President. 7 5 Because "[g]overnmental
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function,"' 7 6 and the Ethics in Government Act deprives the
President of exclusive control over the exercise of that power by
creating a prosecutor over whom he has little supervision, the Act
impermissibly blurs the separation of powers.' 77
Justice Scalia argued that the independent counsel is not susceptible to the normal considerations that govern the execution of
prosecutorial power. Rather, Justice Scalia said, the counsel is focused solely on the prosecution of the object of her investigation. 78
The danger of this untempered single-mindedness, Justice Scalia
stated, was illustrated by the decision of the independent counsel in
a different investigation to subpoena the Ambassador of Canada, an
act that caused considerable strain in American relations with that
country. 179 Such an attempt to breach diplomatic immunity, if un172 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (J. Madison)(C.
Rossiter ed. 1961)).
173 Id. at 2623 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
175 Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 2626-27 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).

177

Id. at 2627 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).

Id. (Scalia,J., dissenting).
Id. at 2627 (Scalia,J., dissenting). In the Spring of 1987, Whitney North Seymour,
the independent counsel investigating former White House staff member Michael
178
179

Deaver, served a subpoena on Canada's Ambassador to the United States. A federal
court quashed the subpoena. United States v. Deaver, No. 87-096 (D.D.C. June 22,
1987). Seymour then sent a letter to the Ambassador in which he made implicit threats

that a failure to cooperate might have adverse repercussions for Canada. See Seymour v.
North America, Wall St.J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 30, col. 1; Independent Counsel Is No Diplomat,
Wall St.J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 30, col. 3. Seymour's actions seriously angered the Cana-
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dertaken by the Department of Justice, would have been squelched
in light of the President's article II, section 2 foreign policy responsibilities, said justice Scalia.'18 0 As a consequence of the unique, single-focus aspect of the independent counsel, Justice Scalia argued,
"the balancing of various legal, practical, and political considerations . .. [which) is the very essence of prosecutorial discretion" is
not carried out:' 8 ' "To take this away is to remove the core of the

prosecutorial function, and not merely 'some' presidential
82
control."1
Justice Scalia's construction of the actual extent of the Attorney
General's powers under the Act diverged sharply from that of the
majority. Regarding the Attorney General's discretion in applying
for the appointment of an independent counsel after a request to do
so, Justice Scalia stated:
As a practical matter, it would be surprising if the Attorney General
had any choice.., but to seek appointment of an independent counsel
to pursue the charges against the principal object of the congressional
request.... Merely the political consequences (to him and the President) of seeming to break the law by refusing to do so would have
been substantial. How could it not be, the public would ask, that a
3,000-page indictment drawn by our representatives over 2 1/2 years
does not even establish "reasonable grounds to believe" that further
investigation or prosecution
is warranted with respect to at least the
18 3
principal alleged culprit?
Similarly, though there is no judicial review of the Attorney General's refusal to seek appointment, Congress may review it, also narrowing the Attorney General's discretion: "the context of this
' 84
statute is acrid with the smell of threatened impeachment."'
Justice Scalia assailed the majority for endorsing a balancing
test to make separation of powers determinations, rather than the
"clear constitutional prescription" that the executive power belongs
exclusively to the President. 8 5 In doing so, the majority gave no
criteria for deciding when a curtailing of executive power by a statute produces an imbalance that renders it unconstitutional:
The most amazing feature of the Court's opinion is that... [ilt simply
announces, with no analysis, that the ability to control the decision
dian Government and it demanded that the State Department intervene. The Department of Justice was forced to seek relief in court. Seymour v. North America, supra, at 30,
col. 1; Independent Counsel Is No Diplomat, supra, at 30, col. 3.
180 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 2624 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
184 Id. at 2625 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
185 Id. at 2629 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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whether to investigate and prosecute the President's closest advisors,
and indeed the President himself, is not "so central to the functioning
of the Executive Branch" as to be constitutionally required to be
within1 8 the
President's control. Apparently that is so because we say it
6
is so.

By not devising "a substitute criterion-a 'justiciable standard' " for
measuring the permissibility of statutory intrusions into the power
of the President, Justice Scalia argued that the majority makes inevitable an "ad hoc approach to constitutional adjudication" in which
such potentially intrusive legislation will be drawn with little prece87
dential restriction.1
Accordingly, Justice Scalia stated, the political limitations of the
Attorney General's powers under the Act means that the functions
of the Executive Branch will be impaired by an erosion of leverage
to implement its policies.18 8 Regarding "the President's high-level
assistants, who typically have no political base of support," Scalia
stated, "it is . . . utterly unrealistic to think that they will not be
intimidated by this prospect [of prosecution by an independent
counsel], and that their advice to him and their advocacy of his interests before a hostile Congress will not be affected."' 8 9 Furthermore, Justice Scalia asserted:
Besides weakening the Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff, it
must also be obvious that the institution of the independent counsel
enfeebles him more directly in his constant confrontations with Congress, by eroding his public support. Nothing is so politically effective
as the ability to charge that one's opponent and his associate are not
merely wrong-headed, naive, ineffective, but, in all probability,
"crooks." And nothing so effectively gives an appearance of validity to
such charges as a Justice Department investigation and, even better
prosecution.19 0
Thus, he stated, the Act indirectly produces an imbalance of political power tilting in favor of the Legislative Branch.' 9 '
Justice Scalia faulted the majority for not attempting "to 'decide
exactly' what established the line between principal and 'inferior'
officers."' 9 2 Justice Scalia blasted its conclusion that the independent counsel is an inferior officer based on the statement cited from
Germaine that "the term [officer] embraces the ideas of tenure, duraId. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
188 Id. at 2630-2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186
187
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tion, emolument, and duties."' 193 Although she may be removed for
"good cause" by the Attorney General, Justice Scalia said, "most (if
not all) principal officers in the Executive Branch may be removed by
the President at will." 194 Thus, removal of the independent counsel

is more difficult than removal of most principal officers, which
would indicate a non-inferior status. 9 5 The majority mischaracter96
ized the independent counsel's authority as "limited," he said.'
Rather, Justice Scalia argued, the Act delegates to the appellant the
"full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative
and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Jus97
tice," as well as a range of specific powers. 1
Finally, Justice Scalia remained unpersuaded by the majority's
contention that the nature of the tenure and jurisdiction of the independent counsel made her an inferior officer.' 9 8 Regarding tenure, he said, "[U]nlike most high-ranking Executive Branch officials,
[the independent counsel] continues to serve until she (or the Special Division) decides that her work is substantially completed."' 9 9
The appellant, he noted, had already served two years, not an insubstantial time period.2 0 0 The fact that appellant's investigation was
20
focused did not make it insignificant, according to Justice Scalia. '
Evidence of this is the enormous amount of attention focused on the
Morrison case, as well as the other independent counsel
20 2
investigations.
Justice Scalia argued that a better basis for deciding the status
of an Executive officer than that provided by the Germaine dictum is
the division of powc.rs as established by the Constitution. 20 3 A review of the meaning of the word "inferior" as it was understood at
the time of the Framers, 20 4 the legislative history behind the except193 Id. at 2633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lnited States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. (Otto)
508, 511 (1879)).
194 Moinson, 108 S. Ct. at 2632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
195 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)).
198 Id. at 2633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 2633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204 "Dictionaries in use at the time of the Constitutional Convention gave the word
'inferior' two meanings which it still bears today: (1) '[flower in place, . . . station ...
rank of life .... value or excellency," and (2) '[slubordinate.'. . . In a document dealing
with the structure (the constitution) of a government, one would naturally expect the
word to bear the latter meaning." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting S.JOHNSON, DicTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).
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ing clause, 20 5 and the "admittedly sketchy precedent in this area" 20 6
led Justice Scalia to the conclusion that although not the sole sufficient reason, "it is surely a necessary condition for inferior officer status that the officer be subordinate to another officer." 20 7 The
independent counsel is not, however, subordinate to another officer; as the majority admits, Justice Scalia noted, "[a]ppellant may
not be 'subordinate' to the Attorney General (and the President)
insofar as she possesses a degree of independent discretion to exercise the powers delegated to her under the Act." 20 8 When operating within the confines of her statutory powers, the independent9
20
counsel is subordinate to no one, "not even.. the President."
Therefore, Justice Scalia stated, the appellant is not an inferior officer, and her appointment as provided for in the Act, which does
2 10
not involve the President and Senate, is unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia predicted an effective eradication of precedent by
the majority's decision regarding the removal of executive officers. 2 11 Before Morrison, said Justice Scalia, precedent established
that the President's power to remove principal officers who performed purely executive duties could not be limited. 2 12 His power
to remove inferior officers who perform purely executive duties and
whose appointment Congress had removed from the appointment
clause process of presidential nomination and Senate approval and
consent could be restricted, said Justice Scalia, at least when an Executive officer made the appointment. 2 13 With its decision in Morrison, Justice Scalia argued, the Court extended this rule to allow
Scalia stated:
It is perfectly obvious.., from the relative brevity of the discussion [at the Constitutional Convention that the addition of the excepting provision to the appointments
clause] received, that it was intended merely to make clear ... that those officers
appointed by the President with Senate approval could on their own appoint their
subordinate, who would, of course, by chain of command still be under the direct
control of the President."
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 2633-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
208 Id. at 2608-09. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
209 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
211 Id.Justice Scalia also referred the reader to the opinion ofJudge Silberman for the
D.C. Court of Appeals in In re Sealed Case, 828 F.2d 476 (D.C. 1987), for a discussion
of the violation of established precedent by the removal limitation prescribed by the Act.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212 Id. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926)).
213 Id. at 2636 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia also cited United States v. Perkins,
116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886)(when Congress by law vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it
deems best for the public interest).
205

978

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 79

restrictions on the President's power to remove inferior officers appointed by the judiciary. 21 4 The sole consideration for doing so,
stated Justice Scalia, is that Congress does not "interfere with the
President's exercise of the 'executive power' and his constitutionally
appointed duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ' 21 5
With this extension, Justice Scalia argued, the Court "swept into the
dustbin of repudiated constitutional principles" the standard of
Humphrey's Executor which evaluated the inferior official's duties as
"purely executive," "quasi-legislative," or "quasi-judicial." 2 16
Although Justice Scalia readily admitted that such distinctions are
not "clear nor even . . .rational .. .at least [they] permitted the
identification of certain officers and certain agencies, whose func2 17
tions were entirely within the control of the President."
According to Justice Scalia, the Morrison holding will allow the
restriction of the removal of any Executive officer, provided that the
President remains "able to accomplish his constitutional role." 2 18
This vague and expansive standard is "an open invitation" for Congress to intrude upon the President's duties. 2 19 Although the Court
retains the ultimate authority to evaluate the permissibility of such
intrusions, Justice Scalia stated that the President should be able to
protect his own branch and the inability to do so creates a severe.
imbalance between the branches. 220 The test illustrated perfectly
Justice Scalia's primary contention in his dissent that the majority
failed to understand the operation of the hydraulic pressures of a
separation of powers, in which "'[a]mbition . . . counteract[s]
ambition.' "221
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with an examination of the
fairness of the prosecutorial process created by the Act upon those
executive officials who become the targets of an investigation. The
dangerous potential of the unfettered prosecutor was described by
Justice Robert Jackson, whom Justice Scalia quoted at length, when
he was Attorney General under President Franklin Roosevelt, in a
speech to United States Attorneys:
With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecu214

Monison, 108 S. Ct. at 2617-2618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

215 Id.
216 Id. at 2636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States,

295 U.S. 602, 631 (1935)).
217 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2637 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
218 id. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2618 (majority opinion)).
219 Id. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 332 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961)).
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tor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some
act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of
discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man
who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then
searching the law books, or putting investigators to work to pin some
offense on him. It is in this realm-in which the prosecutor picks some
person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some
group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the
greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law
enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes personal,
and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political views,
or being 2personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor
22
himself.
The main guard against this potential for abuse, Justice Scalia argued, is the political accountability of the President, who appoints
and removes federal prosecutors: "when crimes are not investigated and prosecuted fairly, nonselectively, with a reasonable sense
of proportion, the President pays the cost in political damage to his
administration." 2 23 According to Justice Scalia, however, the position of independent counsel was designed to operate largely independent and uninfluenced by the President, so this check is not
present: "even if it were entirely evident that unfairness was in fact
the result [of an independent counsel's investigation]. .

.

. there

would be no one accountable to the publicfor whom the blame could be assigned." 224 This independence and singularity of focus, Justice
Scalia stated, may distort the perspective of the prosecutor: "what
would normally be regarded as a technical violation... may in [the]
small world [of the independent counsel] assume the proportions of
an indictable offense." 225 Thus, Justice Scalia warned, the person
under investigation is faced with the "frightening" possibility of a
lengthy, ceaseless investigation that may grow to encompass matters
which a normal prosecutor would consider "picayune" and insufficient to warrant an indictment. 226 For these reasons, Justice Scalia
dissented from the majority's holding.
222 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting R. Jackson, The Fed-

eral Prosecutor, Address Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of the United
States Attorneys (April 1, 1940)).
223 Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 2639 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
225 Id. at 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INTEREST OF THE
INDIVIDUAL

Justice Scalia recognized that "[tihe purpose of the separation
and equilibrium of powers, in general, and of the unitary Executive
in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to
preserve individual freedom. ' 22 7 This freedom is not waived upon
the assumption of one of the Executive Branch offices covered by
the Ethics in Government Act, and those officials are entitled to the
same fair treatment under the law as is accorded those not subject to
the Act. 2 28 By dividing the primary functions of government among
several distinct branches, the Framers sought to avoid a concentration of power through which a democratic republic might become
22 9
ripe for tyrannical rule.

The Court recognized this intent in Buckley v. Valeo: "The men
who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical
statesmen, who viewed the principal of separation of powers as a
vital check against tyranny. ' 2 30 Similarly, in Bowsher v. Synar, the
Court stated:
Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the influence
of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances were the foundation
of a structure of government that would protect liberty. The Framers
provided a vigorous legislative branch and a separate and wholly independent executive
branch, with each branch responsible ultimately
23
to the people. '
Although it would be premature to argue that in upholding the
validity of the independent counsel, the Morrison majority placed the
federal government on a slippery slope toward tyranny, 23 2 it is true
that the absence of an institutional framework of checks and balances within which prosecutorial discretion is normally exercised
encourages abuses of the rights of individuals subject to Ethics in
227 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229 See generally, THE FEDERALIST No. 47 & 48 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

230 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
231 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 720.
232 But see, Troutt & McGuigan, Morrison Case: The Court's Blunder, Legal Times, July
18, 1988, at 14, col. 1, which states:
Thus, the Republic enters a new phase. Congress has created, and the Court here
sanctioned, a mechanism through which the losers of intramural policy debates will
increasingly find themselves facing not merely political reprisal, nor even career
ending or retarding retribution, but criminal investigation. Congress and the Court
have created a monstrous tool for tyranny. From the vantage point of decades
hence, Morrison will be viewed as the decision in this decade most destructive of
liberty and the rule of law.
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Government Act investigations. 23 3 Lost in the placement of the
criminal prosecution function outside of the Executive Branch is the
element of accountability, which serves as a check on the exercise of
this function.
B.

DIVERGENCE FROM THE RECENT SEPARATION OF POWERS
DECISIONS

Morrison diverged from the decisions rendered by the Court in
three recent landmark cases centered on the separation of powers
issue. In Buckley v. Valeo, 23 4 the Court refused to allow Congress to
appoint what it deemed to be executive officers. 23 5 In 1974, Congress had amended the Federal Campaign Act to create an eightmember Federal Election Commission ("FEC"). 23 6 Two members
were to be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate,
two were to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, two were to
be appointed by the President, and the Secretary of the Senate and
Clerk of the House filled the last two positions as ex officio, nonvoting members. 23 7 The FEC exercised, inter alia, wide-ranging enforcement powers, which represented "the performance of a significant governmental duty... pursuant to a public law." 23 8 The Court
held that "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to
the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' and
must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [the appointments clause]." 23 9 The FEC's powers were not merely "of an
233 Even in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986),
which validated the authorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to
adjudicate state law counterclaims as not violating article III, id. at 839, the Court recog-

nized the significance of protecting individual rights when making a separation of powers inquiry. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated:
Article III, § 1 serves both to protect "the role of the independent judiciary within
the constitutional scheme of tripartite government" .... and to safeguard litigants'
right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government." ... Although our cases have provided us with
little occasion to discuss the nature or significance of this latter safeguard, our prior
discussions of Article III, § I's guarantee of an independent and impartial adjudica-

tion by the federal judiciary of the United States intimated that this guarantee serves
to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests.
Id. at 837 (citations omitted). By analogy, this concern for individuals should at least
have been a factor in the Court's determination of the validity of the independent prosecutor provision of the Ethics in Government Act. Yet the Court makes only four vague
references to Schor, Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2614, 2615, 2620, and 2621, and at no point
addresses the issue of the individual's interest.
234 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
235 424 U.S. at 121.
236 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (Supp. IV 1970).
237 Id. at § 437(c).
238 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 141.
239 Id. at 126.
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investigative and informative nature, falling in the same general category as those powers which Congress might delegate to one of its
own committees. ' 240 Rather, the Commission had the authority to
enforce the law: "A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of
the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress that the
Constitution entrusts [this] responsibility. ' 24 1 Thus, Congress
could not create a process under which it retained full oversight of
24 2
the appointment of four members of the FEC.
In INS v. Chadha,243 the Court invalidated the legislative veto,
by which Congress had sought to override executive action through
means less formal than legislation. 2 44 In that case, the Attorney
General had suspended an order of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 24 5 A provision of that legislation allowed
either House of Congress to pass a resolution blocking such suspension, 24 6 which the House of Representatives did against Chadha.
The Court found the provision unconstitutional because it violated
the presentment clause of article 1,247 which requires a bill to pass
both houses and be presented to the President for his signature or
248
veto before it becomes law.
In Bowsher v. Synar,249 the Court prohibited an officer removable
by Congress from performing an executive function. 250 Under the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 2 5 1 the Comptroller General was
given the authority to make certain final decisions regarding the reductions required to balance the federal budget. Because the
Comptroller General was subject to removal by Congress at any
25 2
time, the Act was held to be unconstitutional.
240 Id. at 137.
241 Id. at 138.
242 Id. The Court did not decide whether FEC members were "principal" or "inferior" officers, stating that the Commission appointment process was violative under
either definition.
243 426 U.S. 919 (1983).
244 Id. at 959.
245 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1952).
246 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2) (1952).
247 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
248 Chadha, 426 U.S. at 946-947. The Court said, "'[the decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was based
on the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were
the powers to be most carefully circumscribed." Id.
249 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
250 Id. at 736.
251 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-902 (1985).
252 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-727. The Court said, "[t]o permit an officer controlled by
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in
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In each case, the Court secured responsibility for the exercise
of delegated statutory powers firmly within the Executive Branch.
Prior to Morrison, these precedents suggested that the Court would
interpret the independent counsel provision as a dilution of presidential supervision over an executive function. 253 By upholding the
constitutionality of the independent counsel law, however, the
Court allowed for the placement of a significant, core executive
function 25 4 in an entity operating largely unsupervised by the executive branch.
The "individual freedom" purpose of the separation of powers,
as described by Justice Scalia, was more explicit in Morrison than in
the other three cases. That is, Buckley, Chadha, and Bowsher focused
exclusively on the structural division of powers between ambitious
and competing branches as a means of ensuring effective government. 25 5 The protection of the individual from an overbearing government was not the immediate concern of the Court. In Morrison,
the structural propriety of the independent prosecutor was considered and discussed at great length by the majority. 2 56 However, the
added aspect of the threatened rights of persons such as Olson was
considered by only Justice Scalia. 2 5 7 Because an individual is more
directly and immediately threatened by an unchecked exercise of the
power of criminal prosecution than by an unconstitutional appointment, legislative, or removal process, Morrison would seem to have
any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control
over laws, Chadha makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible." Id.
253 See, e.g., Carter, Halt to the Chief?, Legal Times, August 29, 1988, at 22, col. 1; Bruff,
Special Prosecutor Case a BalancingAct, Legal Times, July 4, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
254 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976)("a lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for the
breach of law, and it is to the President, not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. II,

§ 3.").
255 In Buckley, the Court was concerned that the appointment by Congress alone of
officials performing significant governmental duties as prescribed by law would create
an imbalance of power between the branches. See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying
text. In Chadha, the Court sought to maintain the constitutional division of "delegated
powers of the... federal government into three defined categories ... to assure.., that
each Branch... would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." Chadha, 462 U.S. at
919. Similarly, Bowsher cited this statement from Chadha in arriving at its holding that
"once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly-by passing
new legislation." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34 (citation omitted).
256 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-22. For that discussion, see supra notes 9 1-167 and
accompanying text.
257 Id. at 2637-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying
text.
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presented an even more compelling situation for securing the responsibilities of the Executive Branch than Buckley, Chadha, or Bowsher, the majority's meticulous validation of the Act's appointment
But the Court ignored
and removal process notwithstanding. 25s
the fact that prosecutorial abuses are kept in check by keeping
prosecutorial power separate under the Executive Branch. 2 59
C.

THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE

The majority's opinion did not consider the potential for
prosecutorial abuse under the Act, despite the fact that such abuses
had been a major argument against the validity of the independent
counsel. 260 Those who supported the Act justified such incidents as
the price that must be paid to ensure impartial investigations of the
Executive Branch. 26 1 However, because the majority opinion barely
mentioned the issue of the conflict of interest of an Attorney Gen2 62
eral which had necessitated creation of the independent counsel,
the gain for which this cost to an individual's rights is exchanged
was not within the scope of its consideration. Thus, one of the difficult, fundamental determinations underlying the case-whether the
assurance of impartial law enforcement envisioned by the Act is desirable in light of the unfairness to individuals that inevitably occurs
because of the fervor of prosecution by an independent counsel-is
left unreviewed by the majority's opinion.
Despite the Morrison Court's approach, the Court had recognized in a recent case that persons who become the targets of prolonged criminal investigations, even if ultimately exonerated, are
subjected to extreme financial, emotional, and reputational burdens: 263 "even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching
258 See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
259 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
260 See Brief for Edward H. Levi, Griffin B. Bell, and William French Smith as Amicus

Curiae in Support of Appellees, Morrison, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (No. 87-1279)[hereinafter
Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith]. See also Bertozzi, SeparatingPoliticsfrom the Administration
ofJustice, 67 JUDICATURE 486, 494-95 (1984) (potential for abuses by independent counsels was considered by a 1981 Senate Subcommittee reviewing the law).
261 See, e.g., Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 539,

540 n.4 (1988).
262 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611. This is the only mention of the conflict of interest
issue in the majority's opinion. See also Bruff, Special ProsecutorCase a BalancingAct, Legal
Times, July 4, 1988, at 5, col. 3 ("[A]part from one brief mention of the problem of
conflicts of interest, the majority blandly discussed generalities of separation of
powers.").
263 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2141 (1987). The
Court held that courts may appoint disinterested private attorneys to act as prosecutors
for judicial contempt judgments.
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disruption of everyday life." 264 Given that such disruption occurs in
a normal criminal investigation, as was involved in that case, the experience is further enhanced by the intensity of an independent
counsel's focused investigation. As Justice Scalia observed, "[h]ow
frightening it must be to have your own independent counsel and
staff appointed, with nothing else to do but to investigate you until
investigation is no longer worthwhile-with whether it is worthwhile
not depending upon what such judgments usually hinge on, com' 265
peting responsibilities.
The abuses which occur under the independent counsel law
generally do not rise to the level of due process violations, 26 6 which
may occur once a criminal indictment has been obtained and a formal, judicial proceeding begun. Rather, such abuses have occurred
before an independent counsel's investigation has produced sufficient grounds to warrant an indictment. 26 7 Although the courts
have acknowledged authority to guard against abuses of the former
type, a prosecutor still exercises wide discretion over a variety of
matters which are not, and properly should not be, subject to judicial review. 268 Yet these decisions have great impact on the person
Id. at 2141.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, "no person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," the former applying this requirement to the federal government, the latter to state governments. U.S. CONST.,amend. V,
XIV. The requirement protects the individual'from overreaching by the government:
Tihe due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment-just as that in the
Fifth-has led few to doubt that it was intended to guarantee procedural standards
adequate and appropriate, then and thereafter, to protect, at all times, people
charged with or suspected of crime by those holding positions of power and authority.... From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and
extortion of confessions of violations of the 'law of the land' evolved the fundamental idea that no man's life, liberty, or property be forfeited as criminal punishment
for violation of that law until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a
public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power. Thus,
as assurance against ancient evils, our country, in order to preserve 'the blessings of
liberty,' wrote into its basic law the requirement, among others, that the forfeiture
of the lives, liberties or property of people accused of crime can only follow if procedural safeguards of due process have been obeyed.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-237 (1940)(footnotes omitted).
The due process requirement has led to prohibitions against, inter alia, overly
vague criminal statutes, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), strict liability for
common law offenses imposing severe penalties, Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1952), and criminal liability for an omission without proof that the defendant had
knowledge of the law creating the duty to act, Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957).
267 See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
268 See, e.g, Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). The Court in Wayte stated:
In our criminal justice system, the Government retains "broad discretion" as to
whom to prosecute ...This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that
the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as
264
265
266
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under investigation. 2 69 At the pre-indictment stage of a criminal investigation, the individual is protected against unfair treatment pri2 70
marily by the checks on prosecutorial discretion.
The normal exercise of prosecutorial discretion occurs within a
network of checks and balances. 2 7' Every federal prosecutor is accountable to a superior, with the President as the ultimate authority,
who is in turn accountable to the people. 2 72 Furthermore, in the
course of an investigation, a United States Attorney must consider
the interests of other prosecutors, of law enforcement officials, and
of officials outside of the Department of Justice. 2 73 It was the complete absence of this system of institutional safeguards in the office
of independent counsel which caused three former Attorneys General to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of the decision of
the Court of Appeals:
[T]he checks and balances ... guard against the dangers that are endemic in any government-not the dangers of corruption or gross
abuse, which are rare, but the everyday danger that a prosecutor will
become too close to a case and will lose perspective. The most admirable and dedicated prosecutor may exaggerate the importance of a
case and underestimate its potential to interfere with other important
2 74
government interests and with the lives of the individuals affected.
the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's
overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the
courts are competent to undertake.
Id. at 607-08. Wayte involved the prosecution of a young man eligible for the military
draft who had written government officials stating that he had not registered with the
Selective Service System and did not intend to do so. The Court held that the government's passive enforcement policy for draft avoiders, together with its efforts to persuade nonregistrants to comply, did not violate either the first or fifth amendments. Id.
269 As noted by ex-Attorneys General Levi, Bell, and Smith in their amicus curiae
brief, "[Flor the individual whose privacy is invaded, whose affairs are disrupted, and
who is subjected to extraordinary emotional distress, these [decisions by a federal prosecutor] are likely to be the most significant decisions that any government official ever
makes." Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 5.
270 Young, 107 S.Ct. at 2137. The Young Court stated:
A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination
of which persons should be targets of investigations, what methods of investigation
should be used, what information will be sought as evidence, which persons should
be charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses,
whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which they shall be established, and whether any individuals should be granted immunity. These decisions,
critical to the conduct of a prosecution, are all made outside the supervision of the
court."
Id.
271 Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 8-9. See also Morrison, 108 S.Ct.
at 2627-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272 Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 8-9.
273 Id.
274 Id.

at 9-10.
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Furthermore, because of the political implications of a possible discovery of unethical behavior in the executive branch, great publicity
inevitably accompanies the appointment of an independent counsel:
"Thus, the separation of the Independent Counsel from the Executive Branch necessarily casts aside one of the most decent traditions
of our criminal law system-the tradition that allegations of wrongdoing are not made public until a grand jury has found probable
'275
cause to believe them true."
Events subsequent to the Morrison decision have illustrated the
potential for abuse of the subject of an independent counsel investigation. For example, in the Spring of 1988, Morrison informed O1son that she would seek a protective indictment unless he agreed to
waive the five-year statute of limitations on the case, which was due
to expire on March 10.276 In retrospect, as the investigation produced not even an indictment, such a motion would have clearly
been improper and may have been merely a bluff on Morrison's
part. 2 77 Opponents of the independent counsel law argued that Olson had no real choice but to acquiesce in Morrison's proffered arrangement, because if he had refused, he would have lost the right
to seek reimbursement of the over $1 million in legal costs he had
2 78
incurred in the course of the two year investigation.
Justice Scalia warned that such abusive prosecutorial tactics
would be possible.2 79 Similar questionable tactics have been employed by independent counsels in other investigations. These tactics can be argued to be the result of the absence of accountability.
For example, Independent Counsel James C. McKay concluded in
the final report on his fourteen month investigation of former Attor275 Id. at 16-17.
276 Morrison v. Olson, Continued, Legal Times, August 15, 1988, at 9, col. 2. A protec-

tive indictment, like other "protective" motions, secures the right to take an action, such
as seeking an indictment, at a later date. Protective indictments are used infrequently
and are generally appropriate only in time-sensitive cases, such as those involving a fugitive witness or complex foreign evidence. A motion for an indictment, protective or
otherwise, is improper under the guidelines for federal prosecutors without a reasonable assurance for obtaining a conviction. Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. Pursuant to § 593(0(1) of the Act, subjects of an independent counsel's probe
are only eligible for reimbursement of legal fees if no indictment is filed against them:
[U]pon the request of an individual who is the subject of an investigation conducted
by an independent counsel pursuant to this chapter, the division of the court may, if
no indictment is brought against such individual pursuant to that investigation,
award reimbursement for those reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by that individual during that investigation which would not have been incurred but for the requirements of this chapter.
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (Supp. 1988).
279 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2638. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 222-26 and
accompanying text.
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ney General Edwin Meese that the Attorney General probably violated federal conflict-of-interest and tax laws, yet announced that he
would not prosecute. 28 0 This unusual action brought harsh criticism from prominent former prosecutors of various political sympathies, who argued that McKay's action overstepped the bounds of
prosecutorial propriety. 2 81 "This underscores the vulnerability of
independent prosecutors having to justify their actions," said Joseph diGenova, former United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia under Meese. 2 82 "There is no question that this simply
would not happen in any other federal criminal investigation where
no one is charged." 28 3 Similarly, Abbe Lowell, former special assistant to Democratic Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, stated,
"[McKay's statement] certainly goes against the practice of the Department of Justice in declining prosecutions and raises questions
about whether independent counsels ought to be brought more into
28 4
conformity."
Furthermore, the potential for precisely this abusive maneuver
had been recognized at the time the Ethics in Government Act was
being formulated. In the final report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force in 1975, Associate Special Prosecutor Henry Ruth
wrote that it would be "irresponsible and unethical for a prosecutor
to issue a report suggesting criminal conduct on the part of someone" who was not to be indicted. 28 5 If accountable to an Executive
Officer, Independent Counsel McKay would have been discouraged
28 6
from making such a statement.
It can be argued that the law is unfair because, by giving special
prosecutors unlimited budgets and staffs, it encourages them to pursue an investigation when a normal prosecutor would not.28 7 A bal280
281
282
283

McKay Remarks on Meese Guilt Draw Fire, Legal Times, July 25, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Attorneys General Levi, Bell, and Smith demonstrated an awareness of the effect
of the public statements of a federal prosecutor:
Especially in a case involving a high government official, the pressure to make [public] statements will be great. A prosecutor's public statements can have a profound
impact on an individual's reputation, Moreover, the harm that an alleged suspect
suffers from such publicity will often persist no matter how completely the individual is exonerated.
Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 5.
287 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Act specifies that the Department of Justice "shall," upon request, provide an independent counsel with "the
resources and personnel necessary to perform such independent counsel's duties." 28
U.S.C. 594(d). As noted in the ex-Attorneys General amicus brief:
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ancing of conflicting interests is not carried out by the independent
counsel, opening the way for loss of prosecutorial perspective and
for overzealous pursuit. For example, as early as November 14,
1986, Morrison wrote to then Attorney General Meese that
"[s]tanding in isolation . .. Mr. Olson's testimony of March 10,

1983, probably does not constitute a prosecutable violation, based
on my present understanding of the evidence. '28 8 Yet, Morrison
continued the investigation for two more years.2 8 9 Both the investigations of Olson and Meese were of long duration and the total fees
and costs incurred by each side were considerable.2 90 This freedom
from budgetary constraints has permitted many counsel to adopt a
"scorched earth" approach, in which no evidence is too remote or
too trivial to merit inquiry.2 91 Furthermore, as the cost of an investigation mounts, an independent counsel may be caught in a "vicious
circle" in which further investigation is pursued primarily in response to pressure to justify the undertaking of the probe in the first
Thus, the Independent Counsel can requisition a team of law enforcement officers
who have no competing responsibilities. In all of these ways, the Independent
Counsel essentially escapes the condition that shapes the environment of every
other prosecutor-the need to determine and reassess priorities in a setting characterized by competing interests and demands.
Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 11.
288 Morrison v. Olson, Continued, Legal Times, August 15, 1988, at 9, col. 1.
289 In August 26, 1988, Independent Counsel Morrison declared that she would not
seek criminal charges against Olson. Her one page written statement did not explain
the reasons behind her decision. Special Counsel Ends EPA Case With No Charge, N. Y.
Times, August 27, 1988, page 1, col.3.
290 The two year Morrison probe cost the government more than $1.2 million and
reportedly cost Olson more than $1 million in legal fees, for which he may be reimbursed by the government. No Prosecution in Pricey Investigation, The Christian Science
Monitor, August 29, 1988, at 2, col.2. The fourteen month McKay investigation incurred expenses of $1.7 million while Meese reported legal fees of $100,000-$250,000.
Also, an earlier five and one half month long investigation of Attorney General Meese
had similarly failed to produce an indictment. The costs there were $311,848.11 for the
government and $472,190 for the defense. McKay Remarks on Meese Guilt Draw Fire,Legal
Times, July 25, 1988, at 10, col. 3.
The investigation of Oliver North, John Poindexter, and Albert Hakim by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh most clearly demonstrates the use of unlimited resources. A team of 29 lawyers, 73 administrative staff members, six agents from the
Customs Department, eleven agents from the Internal Revenue Service, and 35 agents
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been assembled to carry out the investigation. After less than one year of operation, Walsh and this staff had conducted over
1000 witness interviews. In that same time period, the investigation had spent more
than $4.7 million, not including the salaries of the agents of the Customs Department,
IRS and FBI. By comparison to these investigations, the entire Public Integrity Section
of DOJ, which investigates and prosecutes cases against federal officials nationwide, operates on an annual budget of $2.35 million. Janis, Prosecutors Without Restraint, Legal
Times, February 1, 1988, at 18, col. 1. See also Morrison, 108 S.Ct at 2631 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
291 Janis, Prosecutors Without Restraint, Legal Times, February 1, 1988, at 18, col. 1.
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With normal budgetary concerns and policy priorities, a
typical federal prosecutor might have declined to commit resources
to such cases which failed to produce indictments.
In the most highly publicized independent counsel investigation, that of Oliver North, John Poindexter, and Albert Hakim by
Lawrence Walsh, questions have been raised regarding the possible
use of North's testimony before Congress against him in a judicial
proceeding. 293 The three defendants were compelled to testify
29 4
before Congress regarding their roles in the Iran-Contra scandal.
Defense lawyers in the case have argued that Walsh, his staff, and
the grand jury which brought the charges may have been "tainted"
by the evidence disclosed at the congressional hearings, so that, in
effect, the government compelled North and others to testify against
themselves, thereby violating their privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment. 2 95 Although a panel of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently ruled against North
and his co-defendants' interlocutory motion to dismiss, it based its
holding on the limitation of an appellate court's jurisdiction to final
decisions of the district courts. 29 6 Thus, the court allowed that the
"[a]ppellants may ultimately be correct in their assertion that if the
grand jury's probable cause determination was 'tainted' by the use
of immunized testimony, dismissal of the indictment will be required to remedy the harm. ' 29 7 In any event, Walsh's ability to pursue the case without violating the fifth amendment rights of the
defendants is unresolved.
292 Some criminal defense experts speculated that Morrison's threatened protective
indictment of Olson was a way to obtain more time to explore all possible leads: "Having spent some $1.3 million on the investigation so far, Morrison may be sensitive to...
potential charges that after all this time and expense, she did not make the most thorough investigation possible." Morrison v. Olson, Continued, Legal Times, August 15, 1988,
at 9, col. 2.
293 See, e.g., Ripston, "The 5th" is a Shieldfor All, L. A. Times, August 6, 1988, at 8, col.
3.
294 North, Hakim, and Poindexter received a limited form of protection called "use"
immunity, which guaranteed that what they said in their congressional testimony could
not later be used against them. Consequently, Independent Counsel Walsh has been
forced to show that he has constructed his argument for conviction independent of the
congressional testimony. U.S. Appeals Court Refuses to Dismiss Iran-Contra Charges, Reuters,
September 30, 1988, AM cycle.
295 Id. The fifth amendment states, in relevant part, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
296 United States v. Poindexter, No. 86-3057, at 6 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 1988)(LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file)(per curiam)(defendants' argument "that the [congressional
'use'] immunity affords them a right not to be prosecuted at all is ill-founded").
297 Id. at 7.

1988]
D.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS

The necessary accountability to guard against such abuses is
difficult to achieve under the Act as it now stands because of political implications not recognized by the majority. The majority's reliance on the powers of the Attorney General to request appointment
and to remove an independent counsel indicates that these powers
must be exercised by the Attorney General in order to restore a
structural balance. 29 8 For example, Morrison's successful attempt
to extend the statute of limitations by threatening Olson with a protective indictment could have been interpreted by Attorney General
Meese as "good cause" for removal. 2 99 This would be permissible
and perhaps even required under the Court's ruling. 30 0 Similarly,
after Independent Counsel Seymour's threats upon the Canadian
Ambassador, his removal would have been justifiable as an action to
ensure against impermissible interference with the President's constitutional duty to carry out foreign policy.3 0 ' Perhaps future Attorneys General will be better able to effectuate such control.
However, it is more probable that the realities of political cosmetics
recognized by Justice Scalia will prove too daunting3 0 2 and any discretion given to the Attorney General by the Act may be illusory,
contrary to the majority's findings. A refusal to request an investigation by an independent counsel in the face of congressional accusations would only enhance the suspicion of a "cover up."3 0 3 It is
298 See supra notes 139-43, 159 and accompanying text.
299 Morrison's action may have violated § 594(f) of the independent counsel provision
which requires an independent counsel to comply with "the established policies of the
Department ofJustice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws." 28 U.S.C. § 594(f).
Such removal might be overruled upon review if the independent counsel could show
that compliance with established policies was "not possible," as excepted by § 594(f). It
would seem that this language is very permissive, to the point of making compliance
entirely a matter of the independent counsel's discretion. Thus, an appropriate refinement of the Act would be to narrow this exception as to when compliance is "not
possible."
300 The Court in Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619-20, stated:
[B]ecause the independent counsel may be terminated for 'good cause', the Execu,tive, through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently performing her statutory responsibilities in a manner that
comports with the provisions of the Act. Although we need not decide in this case
exactly what is encompassed within the term "good cause" under the Act, the legislative history of the removal provision also makes clear that the Attorney General
may remove an independent counsel for "misconduct."
301 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
302 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
303 In fact, many who support the independent counsel mechanism believe that the
Attorney General should have a more limited role in triggering the independent counsel
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this failure to recognize the hard political realities of conflict and
interbranch struggle forming the backdrop to the Morrison case and,
more generally, the Ethics in Government Act, that exposes the majority's opinion to the thrust of Justice Scalia's dissent, and, when
the two opinions are compared, give the majority's a Panglossian
quality.
The former Attorneys General understood the unique nature of
a criminal investigation involving a high government official:
[S]uch cases can raise difficult questions about the distinction between
violations of the law and legitimate governmental activity. And such
cases can become focal points for intense political pressure.
The Department ofJustice undoubtedly has more extensive experience in the prosecution of allegedly corrupt federal and local officials, in a politically charged atmosphere, than any other institution.
The accumulated wisdom and experience of the Department ofJustice
is a unique asset to a prosecutor engaged in such an investigation.
An ad hoc institution like the Office of Independent Counsel will,
by contrast, be confronting every one of these vexing issues for the
first time, and it is likely to find itself at sea in dealing with them. It
will not have developed institutionalized ways of dealing with political
pressure from Congress and other sources.... It will not know how to
assess an official's claim that what might appear to be criminal activity
30 4
was in fact the vigorous performance of the duties of a public office.
Such executive officials become casualties of a larger political struggle between branches.
Although an independent counsel does not choose the subject
of her investigation, Congress may. 30 5 Therein lies the greatest po-

tential for abuse because, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, in the political arena, relationships between participants can become quite
"personal" and the temptation may be great to prosecute those who
are "unpopular with the predominant or governing group ... [who
are] attached to the wrong political views, or ... [who are] person-

ally obnoxious or in the way of" those who may initiate an Ethics in
Government Act proceeding. 30 6 In this way, those who request the
process because the current role gives him an opportunity to "cover up." See Mixter,
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Problems with the Attorney General's Discretionand Propos-

alsfor Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 497, 521-22 (1985) ("In order to fully accomplish the stated
purpose of the Ethics Act, Congress must amend it to provide for some sort of review of
the Attorney General's decisions or remove these decisions from him entirely."). Of
course, under the majority's opinion, the Attorney General's trigger role is essential to
the constitutionality of the Act, as it involves the Executive Branch in the executive function of prosecution. But this does demonstrate the extent to which some would carry
the powers of the mechanism.
304 Brief for Levi, Bell, and Smith, supra note 260, at 14.
305 28 U.S.C. § 592(g) (Congress may request the Attorney General to apply for the
appointment of an independent counsel.).
306 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2638 (quoting R. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address
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appointment of an independent counsel "pick[] the man" and the
independent counsel acts as an unwitting surrogate "searching the
lawbooks . . . to pin some offense on him."30° 7 Thus, a de facto
concentration of government power anathema to the system envisioned by the Framers is created.3 08 Furthermore, if the potential
for subversion of the independent counsel mechanism by Congress
for political ends is conceded, the Court should have decided Morison as it did Bowsher v. Synar, INS v. Chadha, and Buckley v. Valeo,
which each recognized the Framers' fear of self-aggrandizement by
the legislative branch. 30 9
In a sense, the original EPA document dispute in Morrison was
resolved satisfactorily prior to the congressional request of an independent counsel. An attempt by the Executive Branch in the
early stages of the dispute to involve the Judiciary, in which it filed a
civil action asking the District Court to declare that the EPA Administrator had acted lawfully in withholding the documents, was properly resisted by the court, which encouraged Congress and the
President to try "compromise and cooperation, rather than confrontation." 3 1 0 Eventually, such a compromise was reached when certain of the contested materials were turned over to the House
subcommittees. 3 1 ' The course of events up to this point illustrated
Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of the United States Attorneys (April 1,
1940).
307 Id. A recent proposal for refinement of the Act involves an extension of the coverage of the independent counsel process to the Legislative Branch. Eastland, Independent Counselsfor Congress, Wall St.J., September 30, 1988, at 28, col. 3. On his last day in
office, Attorney General Meese issued an order establishing procedures for such a system of independent counsels for members of Congress. Id. This move would give the
Act a political symmetry which it does not now have by extending the intense scrutiny to
which Executive Branch officials are subject to members of Congress. Currently, members of Congress are only subject to investigation by federal prosecutors as are other
citizens. This extension of the coverage of the independent counsel would perhaps produce a counterbalance to its political utility, as members of Congress would be discouraged from requesting investigations in meritless cases by the threat of similar treatment
by the Executive Branch. Thus, a system approximating that envisioned by the Framers,
in which "ambition... counteracts ambition," see supra note 221 and accompanying text,
would be created. Of course, it is also possible that once Congress has experienced the
operation of the independent counsel law, it might reevaluate and do away with the law.
Proponents of Meese's order have admitted that the demise of the law may be a probable and proper result. Eastland, Independent Counselsfor Congress, supra, at 28, col. 3.
308 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2623 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
309 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727; Chadha, 426 U.S. at 951. See
supra notes 234-52 and accompanying text.
310 United States v. House of Representatives of the United States, 556 F. Supp. 150,
153 (D.D.C. 1983). The court held that the exercise ofjurisdiction over the DOJ's action for a declaratory judgment of executive privilege was improper.
311 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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the necessary haggling, frictional process of dispute resolution in a
government formed of ambitious, competing branches. However,
Congress' persistence after the original matter in contention had
been resolved showed the utility of the independent counsel mechanism as a wieldy tool for the harrassment of the Executive
31 2
Branch.
In light of the abuses associated with the Act, its refinement
seems essential. 313 Although an attack on the Act on constitutional
grounds is, at this point, quixotic, alternatives for worthwhile
amendments to the Act are possible.3 14 For example, an appropriate refinement could be the deletion of the requirement of a filed
report in situations in which the independent counsel concludes his
or her investigation without an indictment. However, methods for
achieving an increased accountability for independent counsels are
more difficult to devise. The most effective method of guarding
against prosecutorial abuses is through the political accountability
of the unitary Executive, which is, of course, absent from the independent counsel process. Without the accountability that comes
from the clear delineation of responsibility for the exercise of
prosecutorial power, abuses will continue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Morrison v. Olson,3 15 the Supreme Court diverged from the
separation of powers precedent established in Buckley, Chadha, and
Bowsher. Although the balancing test adopted by the Court may not
be as novel an approach as Justice Scalia suggested, certainly the
recent trend in separation of powers cases was toward a more formal delineation of responsibilities among the branches of the federal government. After the Morrison decision, one can expect to see
an ad hoc adjudicative approach by the Court as it struggles to determine what are permissible intrusions upon the Executive Branch
312 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2625 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia stated: "[B]y
the application of this statute in the present case, Congress has effectively compelled a
criminal investigation of a high-level appointee of the President in connection with his
actions arising out of a bitter power dispute between the President and the Legislative
Branch." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313 As Justice Scalia noted, however, both the political cosmetics and utility of the
independent counsel provision may cause Congress to leave the Act untouched:
[Ilt is difficult to vote not to enact, and even more difficult to vote to repeal, a
statute called ... the Ethics in Government Act. If Congress is controlled by the
party other than the one to which the President belongs, it has little incentive to
repeal it; if it is controlled by the same party, it dare not.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
314 See supra notes 299, 307.
315 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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without the guidance of the Humphrey's Executor 3 16 standard.
A direct, bitter confrontation between the President and Congress formed the backdrop to the investigation of appellee Olson
and the independent counsel mechanism must be viewed within the
context of this interbranch struggle if a consideration of its constitutional validity is to be complete. There is irony in the fact that an
Act originally intended to separate politics from the administration
of justice instead has now been easily, albeit subtly, transformed
into a means of initiating criminal prosecution for political purposes. Because the majority pretermitted this political content to
the Morrison case, such a subversion of the independent counsel
mechanism was not examined. The majority's opinion considered
only the technical, formal aspects of the independent counsel provision in determining that it conformed with constitutional restrictions and did not upset the balance of power among the branches of
government. However, as Justice Scalia recognized, and events
have demonstrated, the actual implementation of the provision
presents a substantial intrusion into the responsibilities of the President, as well as encouraging the use of questionable prosecutorial
tactics.
The authority to undertake a criminal investigation in pursuit of
an indictment carries the potential for abusive treatment of those
individuals who become subject to such investigations, even if the
authority is exercised in good faith. By placing responsibility for
this function solely within the boundaries of the Executive Branch,
accountability for its exercise is achieved because the head of that
branch must be able to justify any excessive or uneven enforcement
or pay the price in the loss of political esteem. Because, as Justice
Scalia noted, an independent counsel is subordinate to no one when
operating within the confines of his or her established jurisdiction,
3 17
there is little to temper his or her pursuit of an indictment.
Although overly aggressive prosecution by a typical United States
Attorney is not unheard of, under the Ethics in Government Act, the
single-focus prosecutor, who possesses a natural susceptibility for
overzealous investigation, is institutionalized. Thus, abuses in
prosecutorial discretion will arise more regularly and more frequently. Although legislative refinement of the independent counsel provision may curb future prosecutorial excesses, the most
316 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
317 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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effective method would be to return full responsibility for the enforcement of criminal law to the Executive Branch.
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